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Abstract  
In this paper are presented methods of impact analysis on informatics system security accidents, 
qualitative and quantitative methods, starting with risk and informational system security 
definitions. 
It is presented the relationship between the risks of exploiting  vulnerabilities of security system, 
security level of these informatics systems, probability of exploiting the weak points subject to 
financial losses of a company, respectively impact of a security accident on the company. 
Herewith are presented some examples concerning losses caused by excesses within 
informational systems and depicted from the study carried out by CSI. 
 
 
 1. Introduction. Problem  statement  
The International Standard ISO/CEI 17799 [1] Informatics technology – Security techniques – 
Code of practice for Informatics security management defines risk as the combination between 
the probability of occurrence of certain event and its consequences. From the point of view of 
informatics systems’ security, the risk represents the combination between the probability of 
occurrence of a break in the security system of informatics systems and the impact on the 
capacity of those systems for carrying out the designed security functions. 
The risk can be considered like as a threat that could exploit the possible vulnerabilities of the 
system, with a certain probability. It is an undesired and unpleasant event, which waits to occur, 
but that due certain reasons may not appear or through certain methods may be avoided. In order 
to prevent the occurrence of an undesired event generating considerable impact on the security of 
informatics systems, security measures should be taken. These security measures are called 
simply measures or controls. In this article we are not talking about the security measures that 
can be adopted in order to reduce the risk level concerning the security. 
Risk level is an arbitrary indicator, denoted L, which allows grouping certain risks into equivalency 
classes. These classes include risks which are placed between two limit levels –  acceptable and 
unacceptable – conventionally established. It is determined through risk evaluations, on the basis 
of an adequate combination between the occurrence probability of a security event and the 
maxim consequences (impact) that the event may have upon the respective system. 
The acceptable risk level is the risk level conventionally admitted by the organization 
management, regarded as not causing undesirable impacts on its activity. This is determined by 
methodic and specific evaluations.    
The residual risk is considered to be the reminder after the risk treatment. As a general rule, the 
residual risk may be regarded as risk on acceptable level.   
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Assuming the risk definition set forth upwards, this is a positive real number R  which may be 
represented by the area of a quadrangle surface, having as one side the Probability of occurrence 
of certain event, noted with ,P and as the other side the consequences of that event occurrence, 
respectively the Impact of the undesirable event, noted with ,I  upon the security of the studied 
organization. Mathematically speaking, the same area may be obtained through various 
combinations between P and ,I  of which the preferred one is quite the product between 
probability and impact.  There are a lot of Probability – Impact couples generating the same Risk 
,R  defining quadrangles of same area as illustrated in figure 1. 
If the vertexes of such quadrangles, which are not on axes, are linked through a continuous line it 
results a hyperbolic curve C , named the Curve of Risk [2]. This curve allows the differentiation 
between the acceptable risk (Tolerable – T) and the unacceptable one (Non-Tolerable – NT).  
Thus, the risk of occurrence of a certain event A, with high impact, with serious consequences but 
low probability of occurrence, defined by coordinates placed below the represented acceptability 
curve is considered acceptable, while the risk of event B, with less serious consequences but 
high probability of occurrence, of which coordinates are placed upwards the curve, is considered 
unacceptable.  
Hyperbolic curve of risk based on couples (Probability, Impact) is illustrated in figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Graph representation for equivalency  of Risks 
defined by different  Probability – Impact couples 
 
Risk
RiskfSecurity 1)( ==  (1) 
and is presented in the table 1. 
Security function is a function of a 
system (equipment) by help of which 
the risk is eliminated or reduced, or 
is only drawn the attention of a risk 
occurrence. 
Security level is an indicator 
showing in general the security 
status of a system. It is determined 
indirectly, by determining the risk 
level and it is in inverse proportion to 
it.  
The following relation describes the 
connection between the risk level 
and the security level:  
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Concerning risk levels, in the present paper, due to practical reasons, for significations present in 
column 2 we will use the abbreviations present in column 3 of table 1. 
 
Table 1: Relation between the risk level and the security level 
No. Risk Level  Risk signification Notation
Security 
Level 
Security 
signification 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
1 R1 Minimum, Non risk  N S7 Excellent 
2 R2 Very low  VL S6 Very good 
3 R3 Low L S5 Good 
4 R4 Medium  M S4 Acceptable 
5 R5 High H S3 Low 
6 R6 Very high VH S2 Very low 
7 R7 Critical C S1 Insignificant 
 
Risk criteria are reference terms against which the meaning of the risk (level) is determined.   
There are several risk criteria categories, such as for example: 
- specific consequences; 
- costs or associate benefits; 
- socio-economical aspects; 
- the perception of interested parties; 
- the occurrence frequency of security incidents; 
- the cumulated effects of some incidents occurrence; 
- uncertainty rate of determined risk level and of accepted trust level; 
- the residual risk level admitted by each organization. 
 
 2. Economic improvement of the Security Level 
All risk assessment methods present some drawbacks. Basically these are as follows: 
- the values utilized are estimative; 
- calculations are based on statistic and probability analyses; 
-  the data must be periodically up-dated. 
A reduced security level has as effect the increase of business risk, as presented in table 1 
Ensuring a high level of security can affect the business with significant expenses that can be 
utilized for other purposes, considered by many much more important. 
Like in other activities here too must be found the optimum balance between the costs and 
benefits. It may be considered that the law 20-80 (Pareto Diagram) can be applied also in this 
case, with satisfactory results [2,3]. It is also considered that in most cases, 20% of the costs are 
reflected in accomplishments of desired benefits in a percentage of 80% - in our case 
minimization of the security costs. A maximum security S7 (respectively an increase of only 20%) 
can be obtained with addition of extremely high expenses, practically with 80%. In figure 2 is 
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shown the graphic illustration of this law concerning relation costs-benefits in order to achieve 
security of informatics systems.  
 
 
 
         Figure 2. Relationship costs - benefits. 
 
Always implementation or tests and improvement the security generate costs concerning 
equipments, personnel and time spent for implementing security, including checks or simulations 
Those risk assessment are carried out mainly in the big companies and eventually in the medium-
size ones. In small organization there is no enough personnel trained to do that kind of analysis 
and also there is no money to pay a specific company to do it. Taking all that into account, the 
least they could do is to spend some money for a minimum set of security measures. It is well 
known that managers do not invest in things that are not profitable at that moment and that, when 
they do spend different amounts of money, those are under the imposed limit for that kind of 
costs. In such case, there must be assured a security and its costs has to be under the line of a 
certain amount of money.  
In order to measure the security level within a company with concern to means utilized for 
automatic data processing there can be utilized a financial Security Indicator, noted as fSI , 
which is defined by the following formula: 
1–  
Ce
Cc  PCe
SI
n
i
ii
f
∑ ⋅+
=   (2) 
where: Ce – the cost of calculation technique equipment and software used; 
Pi – the weight of the measure agreed in the security system; 
Cc – the cost of the controls for the equipment or software adopted. 
The manager of the organization is 
the person deciding how much is he 
willing to pay for the security, 
decision that is taken on the basis of 
a technical-financial analysis.  
Security is very difficult to quantify. 
One can never state that within the 
organization we have a certain level 
of security. It only can be estimated 
as an excellent, very good, good, 
acceptable, low or insignificant level 
of security. Even though, an 
evaluation (at least financial) can be 
made concerning the security level.. 
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In the case in which there are no investments in equipment assuring security the value of this 
indicator is zero. 
When 1SI0 f ≤<   – there is a minimum security level, but not inexistent. 
When 1SIf >  then we can say that the way in which it is assured the security is more expensive 
than the equipment itself. In this case, the reasons are several, such as: 
- the risks were not well evaluated and/or security measures were exaggerated; 
- the equipment (computer) is not of quality and needs additional equipments; 
- the up-dated equipment value is low as compared to the cost of security measures. 
In the first case, not to lose information, there has been made an exaggeration about the security 
measures – like financial investment or like number. In other words, the prices for those 
investments are too expensive or it is invested more than it is needed. 
The second case occurs when there are bought poorly-qualitative computers and later equipment 
that may compensate this situation are required. This is the case of computers "no names" or 
even if they have, they are old and no longer present safety under operation. It is quite often 
encountered the situation when new bought computers get blocked in case of electric voltage 
fluctuations.  
The third case is encountered when the cost of equipment is up-dated to the new value. If the 
computers as well as the control equipments were bought at close data and the cost of the 
equipment as well as that of control measures are simultaneously up-dated, then the SIf does not 
change so much. 
When is desired an optimization formula for the software price, then we have to consider that the 
license to be bought can be utilized for each personal computer (PC) to be installed on and that 
only certain operating soft beneficiate of installation licenses only on the server serving these PC. 
There will be taken into account the costs for all software installed on the respective computer, 
up-date cost for each of it, possibility of a breakdown for the hard disk and need to reinstall the 
program on that computer, cost of antivirus to be installed and its permanent updating. All these 
special soft have various prices. For example a Windows XP 2003 license, type OEM (can be 
installed only one time) costs about 150€  and a license that can be reinstalled, for the same 
software product, exceeds 350€. There must be carried out an analysis that should consider the 
probability of PC breakdown, due to several reasons, requiring reinstallation about 2 (two) times 
within 3 (three) years – period of time agreed as moral wear of this software, after which a re-
installable license is purchased.  
The price for an AutoCAD license exceeds 3500 €  and it can be reinstalled on any computer, 
subject that the program is not running on several computers simultaneously. The acquisition of 
“subscription” option for the respective AutoCAD costs approximate 220 €  per year and allows an 
automatic up-date to the versions to be created. 
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There is also the opportunity to “rent” AutoCAD license, for a certain period (for example 3 years), 
for 40-60 € per year for each PC, an offer that is starting to be successful. 
All these economical analyses are part of the organization development strategy, representing an 
independent and difficult actions.  
 
3. Economically analysis of the impact reduction  
There are several methods for estimating the possible losses and the calculation of recovery 
costs.  
An already classical method for economical analysis of the threat impact mentioned in ISO/IEC 
13335-3 Informatics technology- Guidelines for the management of IT security – Part 3: 
Techniques for the management of IT security  is called Analyzed Loss Expectancy – ALE. It is a 
simple quantitative method, which allows estimation of the possible losses based on already 
existent company records, kept by an expert, in the organization.  
ALE depends on the value of the asset, on the possibility to loose its value, vulnerability to the 
respective threat and threat occurrence frequency. This method is below briefly presented:   
The following abbreviations are proposed: 
AV = Asset Value – the costs needed for replacement and those caused by losses of any of the 
organization assets (tangible and intangible); 
PVL = Potential Value Loss – measures the impact on assets or quantifies the loss when the 
event occurs, being expressed in percentage (%) against the asset value;   
ARO = Analyzed Rate of Occurrence – frequency the event is expected to occurred. It is a 
statistical estimation usually provided by some specialty institutions based on some data that it 
already has. 
ALE is calculated according to the formula: 
ALE = AV x PVL x ARO   (3)  
There can be included another measure – recalculated ALE – representing the maximum value of 
the security investments that we agree to spend for protection against threats.  
Calculation example: 
ARO (frequency) – has value 
10
1
( the event can occur once every 10 years) 
PVL (potential asset value loss) – 50%; 
AV (asset value) is considered at 50000 €; 
ALE = AV x PVL x ARO = 50000 x 0.50 x 0.1 = 2500 € 
In other words, there is the possibility that due to not taking into account the risk associated to this 
asset loss, the organization may loose every year 2500 €. 
Sometimes another indicator is utilized – SOL (Single Occurrence Loss) – when the company is 
interested on the value of the damage caused by a single occurrence of a threat in case of 
extremely important assets and the second occurrence does no longer count. It is similar to ALE, 
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but the result of this analysis forms the response to the question “It is possible to assure or not” 
to continue the business in case of disaster. 
Calculation example: 
AV = 5 millions €; 
PVL = 10%; 
SOL – AV x PVL = 5 x 106 x 10-1 = 500000 €. 
Both methods may serve as basis for impact assessment, when all assets, weak points, threats 
and their occurrence frequencies have been identified. The impacts can be determined and 
consequently grouped into logical structured groups. 
There are several such structure modalities, the basic example having only with 2 impact levels: 
“tolerable”(T) or “Non-Tolerable" (N). 
The method recommended by ISO IEC TR 13335-3 is to complete a simple matrix, while 
considering the possible loss value and the threat occurrence frequency. For both variables there 
are decided 5 classes, the highest one being 4 as can be noticed in table 2.  
 
Table 2: Impact assessment considering loss value and the threat occurrence frequency 
Possible losses 0 1 2 3 4 
Frequency      
4 0 NT NT NT NT 
3 T NT NT NT NT 
2 T T NT NT NT 
1 T T T NT NT 
0 T T T T 0 
 
In this case the impact can be associated with the risk. 
  
 4. A case study about the evolution of the impact 
Every year, Computer Security Institute (CSI) carries out different studies with the participation of 
the San Francisco Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Computer Intrusion Squad. 
These studies are used by every company to concentrate their efforts to counteract the most 
frequent attacks. The survey results are based on the opinion and the responses of different 
computer security practitioners in U.S. corporations, government agencies, financial institutions, 
medical institutions and universities. 
The CSI survey it is said to have been conducted anonymously as a way of enabling respondents 
to speak freely about potentially serious and costly events that  have occurred within their 
networks over the past year. Organizations covered by the survey include many areas from both 
the private and public sectors. The sectors with the largest number of responses came from the 
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financial sector (20 percent), followed by consulting and education (11 percent), informatics 
technology (10 percent), and manufacturing (8 percent). The diversity of organizations responding 
was also reflected in the 9 percent designated as “Other” [6]. 
Taking into account the information given by CSI, we made comparisons between the last two 
years, 2006 and 2007 for distinguishing the losses suffered by the companies. The average 
annual loss reported in 2007  survey shot up to $350424 from $168000 the previous year. The 
result are presented in table 3. 
 
Table 3: The evolution of the losses between 2006 and 2007 
Type of abuse 
Value 2006 
USD 
Value 2007 
USD 
% 
Financial Fraud 2556900.00 21124750.00 7.26 
Virus 15691460.00 8391800.00 -0.47 
System penetration by outsider 758000.00 6875000.00 8.07 
Theft of confidential data 
not 
mentioned 
5685000.00   
Laptop or mobile hardware theft 6642660.00 3881150.00 -0.42 
Insider abuse of Net access or email 1849810.00 2889700.00 0.56 
Denial of services 2922010.00 2888600.00 -0.01 
Fishing 647510.00 2752000.00 3.25 
Bots 923700.00 2869600.00 2.11 
Theft of proprietary info from mobile device 
theft 
6034000.00 2345000.00 -0.61 
Theft of confidential data from mobile device 
theft 
not 
mentioned 
2203000.00   
Sabotage of data or network 260000.00 1056000.00 3.06 
Unauthorized access to informatics 10617000.00 1042700.00 -0.90 
Web site defacement 162500.00 725000.00 3.46 
Telecom fraud 1262410.00 651000.00 -0.48 
Misuse of wireless network 269500.00 542850.00 1.01 
Misuse of public application 
not 
mentioned 
251000.00   
Instant messaging abuse 291510.00 200700.00 -0.31 
Password sniffing 161210.00 168100.00 0.04 
Blackmail 
not 
mentioned 
160000.00   
Exploit of yours organization DNS server 90100.00 104500.00 0.16 
Abuse of wireless network 469010.00 not mentioned   
Others 885000.00 123500.00 -0.86 
Total  52494290.00 66930950.00 0.28 
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At this survey participated in the year 2006, 616 computer security practitioners and in 2007 - 
494. The results of this survey indicate that cyber crime is a critical concern. Every organization is 
vulnerable to numerous types of attack from many sources and the result of an intrusion can be 
devastating in terms of lost assets and good will. 
Insider abuse of network access or email edged out virus incidents as the most prevalent security 
problem. 
It is easily seen that the most important losses are because of the system penetration by the 
outsiders and the financial fraud. The losses caused by those factors are very import – the sums 
were raised with 8.07% and with 7.26%. 
It is seen that the biggest loss in 2007 is due to financial fraud and not by viruses like in 2006. I 
cannot say that these results can be expanded to all the companies because of the small number 
of respondents but I can consider them important because the survey is sent to roughly the same 
group each year.  
About the costs of computer crime – there are some informatics about those cost and the 
percentage of IT Budget Spent on Security. 61% said that their organizations allocated 5 % or 
less of their overall IT budget to informatics security like it is seen in the figure 3: 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The percentage of IT Budget Spent on Security 
 
A quick comparison of the bars at 3 to 5 % level shows a significant uptick in 2007 and we must 
notice that in 2006, 47 % said their organization allocated less than 3 % of the total IT Budget, 
whereas this year only 35 % fell into that range. 
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The general picture is that security programs budgets are slightly up. Expressing the budget as a 
percentage of the IT budgets means that the actual number of dollars spent depends on whether 
the IT budget is growing or decreasing.   
 
 Conclusions 
Can say that security is improving within companies, but, the losses to cybercrime are bigger this 
year than the last one.  
The country’s economy relies on networked computer informatics systems for communications, 
energy distribution, commerce, transportation and in other domains.  It is known that cybercrime 
and the attendant threat of identity theft reduce user and consumer confidence, reducing the 
acceptance of e-commerce.  
And so, computer security has moved to a position of prominence in most organization being a 
critical activity that helps protecting the systems. But, we can say that if we want to have a certain 
security level we must first know the threat we are bewaring of. And after that, when testing the 
organization’s security, we must act like a real hacker because in that way we can discover all the 
lacks in our system and then, periodically  we must develop new vulnerability tests. 
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